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One of the most controversial parts of F. A. Hayek’s work is his theory of cultural
evolution. By starting with current discussions on biological and cultural selection
theories we bring individual, kin and group selection aspects together and to shed
some light on Hayek’s thoughts on the Theory of Mind. We find that these thoughts
traced out from his work on the “Sensory Order”, need to be combined with his
thoughts on cultural evolution. Both works can be backed by kin selection
arguments and extended by a theory of cultural learning in which individual
selection plays an important role. In doing so, we offer a more integrated view on
Hayek’s theory of cultural selection with respect to moral rules and collective choice
processes in societies.
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Introduction
When societal evolution is at stake, economists usually do not follow the general thoughts of
biological evolution and often argue that most of group selection phenomena would be
incompatible with thoughts of methodological individualism. Nevertheless, recent emerging
theories in social sciences contrasting biological with cultural group selection seem to
redefine the issue and lead to some new insight on cultural evolution with respect to Hayekian
arguments.
In our view, most of the current misunderstandings of Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution
results from the fact that Hayek has never delivered a complete theory of learning. This, until
today, has lead to a rather restricted impact of his thoughts on cultural evolution in the realm
of economics and public choice. Hayek therefore seems to offer a rather underdeveloped body
of theories on how societies build and change their system of rules.
Newer theories suggest – based on a series of similarities to Hayek’s own thinking – that
cultural transmission, consistent with his importance placed upon the selection of rules by
individuals, leads to a model of group selection in the Hayekian sense.
By focusing on a kin selection model and on conservative learning we try to unify Hayek’s
central aspects stemming from his work “The Sensory Order” with his Theory of Cultural
Evolution. In our view, a first new viewpoint stems from Sober and Wilson’s (1997:165)
statement that “[s]ocial norms can favor the evolution of group-level adaptations by altering
the costs and benefits of altruistic primary traits and by creating a diversity of internally stable
social systems that can be sifted by group selection”.
As is well known, Hayek’s main argument on group selection is that by choosing rules
individuals change their group and become a member of the group from which they adopt the
rules. This argument may be supported by models of cultural kin selection since in cultural
processes the strategies (rules) are not transmitted by genes but by learning. Since rules have
signaling qualities, individuals are able to distinguish societies by their rules and choose their
group via the selection of rules.
2
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Second, group selection is not the only process of biological and cultural evolution. Group
selection, following Sober and Wilson (1998) is a multilevel process covering individual, kin
and group selection. In much the same way, one cannot allow for individual selection and
exclude kin selection or group selection arguments. All three aspects matter as “distinctions
between individual, kin, and group selection arguments ... derive primarily from differences in
emphasis rather than from differences in fundamental concepts.”
3 Individual selection means
that only a single strategy is selected which means that the relevant group consists of only one
genotype. By extending the selection unit to a family, kin selection is operating, while the
selection of a whole group corresponds to properties of a larger group. (Sober and Wilson
1998:67). We argue that any useful approach needs to focus both on individual and group
selection phenomena. It is more appropriate to stress the consequences of individual choice
for group or kin selection when the explanation of cultural evolution is at stake.
The mere point is that in Hayek’s theory as well as in most models of kin selection, the
conclusions drawn today still do not thoroughly explain the transition of small groups to open
societies. In order to capture these properties it is necessary to model the selection of rules.
Furthermore, Hayek’s ideas on group selection follow current thoughts on cultural selection:
A group that becomes extinct does not require physical death of the individuals. The
extinction of a group in the cultural sense simply means that all group members became
members of different groups by adopting all their - different - rules.
By starting with the setting of current approaches we are able to narrow down Hayek’s
intention: Following Boyd and Richerson (1985:283), the specific claim about cultural
transmission is that it “differs from genetic transmission because it includes the inheritance of
acquired variation”.
Next, Hayek is not a biologist. Hayek’s approach follows much closer an individualistic and
subjectivist approach to cultural evolution than biologists. His intention is not to extend the
Darwinian theory of social change to culture and to ask, to what extent cultural transmissions
might match Darwinian principles in order to describe the same process of evolution, since
“whether group selection also operate in biological evolution remains an open question – one
on which my argument does not depend.”
4
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In our view, most of the unnecessary critique on Hayek is based upon an ill-suited perception
of his thoughts on cognition. Vanberg’s (1986) critique holds insofar as methodological
individualism can hardly be the adequate method to form a complete theory of human
evolution from instincts to reason. It is rather the failure of Hayek’s theory to explain cultural
evolution without an underlying theory of learning. Vanberg (1986) is right that Hayek’s
notions on group selection, seen from the current state of existing models seem particularly
vague; in addition to that one could easily argue that Hayek never followed completely all the
implications of individual, kin and group selection in his theory of cultural evolution. This
incompleteness is simply due to the fact that he failed to strengthen his arguments of
individual selection taking place.
Moreover, we think that Hayek’s intention was clearly what Sober and Wilson (1998) stated,
namely that cultural evolution leads to more or less adaptive subgroups, without assuming
that any selection process needs to lead to optimal results. In our view, Hayek’s achievement
was especially to point out how a gradual suppression of instincts together with the
emergence of individual selection leads to modern societies.
Morality
In a new paper, Rubin (2000:1) addresses the implication of group selection for the analysis
of human altruism and finds that “[m]orality tends to mimic the effects of group selection”
(Alexander 1987:192). More differently, Hayek did not directly follow Darwin’s approach to
explain morality in human evolution as a phenomenon of group selection. His argument is on
the effects of individual selection and morality. In most human social groups, cultural
transmission is guided by a set of norms that identify what counts as acceptable behavior.
Cultural transmission itself has adaptive advantages in highly variable environments
(Richerson and Boyd 2000:11). If we follow the Campbellian notion, “[h]uman culture is
information transmitted from person to person via teaching and imitation, much as genes are
information transmitted from person to person in the course of reproduction.”
5 Within this
manifold process, Hayek focuses on the individual choice of moral rules and the effects
resulting therefrom.
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5 Richerson and Boyd (2000:1). The idea that natural selection would be “the master force in cultural evolution”
is of course not followed by Hayek.5
Altruism
Hayek’s goal of explanation is not the explanation of the emergence of altruism but the
evolution of the Open Society. This, like any society, needs altruistic behavior. However, this
does not mean altruism needs to be the explanandum of cultural evolution. Altruism does not
form the core of Hayek’s work; what he had in mind was the double-sided aspect of
individual and group selection. Rubin’s (2000) argument is that “tastes” for altruism lead in
the right direction “because group selection sets the limits for altruism”. Hayek, in this
analysis, analyzes the long-term effects of rules on groups and their growth when individuals
– in the extreme - select their group membership by selecting the rules.
Hayek’s three steps toward cultural evolution
Hayek mentions three levels of human evolution and in consequence of the evolution of
specific rules therein.
 6
- Biological evolution: The first level of evolution which is formed by biological evolution
forms the man’s early and primordial history. At this level we find genetically fixed
specific social behaviors emerging through a selection process. As a consequence thereof
human instincts are fixed. Without those instincts individuals are unable to survive in this
early stage of human evolution. Due to their genetic fixation, instincts form part of human
behavior despite their counteracting quality in evolved societies.
- Evolution of intelligence, knowledge and rationality: The second level of societal
evolution concerns the evolution of human intelligence, knowledge and rationality.
However, this does not form civilization. Hayek emphasizes that the development of
cultural evolution occurs before the evolution of human reason.
- Evolution of civilization: The third level has to be located between the development of the
instincts and the development of human reason. At this level civilization gains ground.
By focusing on these three different levels, Hayek explains the stratification of the rules of
conduct. Hayek starts by mentioning that the rules of conduct have a broad foundation in
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instincts, being developed on the first level of evolution, followed by a large number of  rules
of conduct that humans have learned to adopt during the different social orders they have
passed through. Starting from the tribe, where individuals must follow only a small number of
rules of conduct based on tradition as the other rules of conduct are transmitted genetically,
this number increases during the civilization process until the modern society has been
reached. These rules are not consciously adopted by the individuals, they have spread out
because some practices enhanced the prosperity of certain groups. The latest developed rules
form a thin layer of consciously designed rules and follow a specific goal.
Hayek introduces his thoughts on societal evolution by starting with a situation where the
genetic fixation of instincts occurs. As a result, small groups can be built. In this “face-to-face
society“ strong linkages with relatives are prevalent. Instincts play a decisive role and
represent the best available adaptations to the prevailing environment. These instincts Hayek
calls the moral rules of small groups or the natural morality.
7 They serve to steer the
cooperation of the members of the group. This form of cooperation has been established by
trust; the behavior among the members is supported by altruism, solidarity, sympathy and
group decisions.
The important step forward in societal development takes place with a change in the
environment, together with the introduction of trade. At this point the group and its behavior
will change and as a consequence a new social order will arise.
Hayek, quoting Trotter (1916) consequently extends his theory towards individual selection:
“This gradual replacement of innate responses by learned rules increasingly distinguished
men from other animals, although the propensity to instinctive mass action remains one of
several beastly characteristics that man has retained.”
8
Hence, it is not the instincts that lead to a beneficial life within the group, but the gradual
suppression of the instincts together with the correction of the old rules of conduct or the
development of new rules of conduct. The possibility of trade with individuals who are not
members leads to the division of labor and specialization and as a consequence of the division
of knowledge. Trade cannot be based upon collective knowledge but it needs the existence of
a distinctive, individual knowledge. As a consequence private property instead of common
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ownership needs to be established. According to Hayek
9, private property is the fundamental
principle of the cultural evolution. These new phenomena let the group grow richer and faster,
but the consequences of the new experiences are the separation of goals for different
members. Hence, individually different knowledge leads also to a different perception and to
an individually different cognitive framework.
At this point in the evolutionary process the rules of conduct embedded in traditions become
abstract and refer to bans and prohibitions. Different groups of individuals use different
spontaneously emerging rules of conduct. These rules are selected and those groups which by
accident follow the best selected rule survive better than other groups. Examples of rules
emerging in this way are the rules of morality, here: the moral rules of the large group. These
rules – in Hayek’s own words - concern private property, honesty and savings and are
embedded in traditions and transmitted by learning. The new rules of conduct, embedded in
traditions, need to be transmitted from one generation to the next. This is possible through the
cultural learning mechanism, which starts at an individual level, but also occurs on a group
level.
Cultural learning and hence the individual choice of rules enables an Open Society - open in
the sense of openness for strangers. Cultural evolution is not only supported by tradition but
also by reason. Moral rules of conduct that emerge spontaneously cannot be understood by
reason. Here, tradition can be seen as the special endowment of individuals that operates on a
different plane compared to reason.
 10 Reason, in Hayek’s eyes, can help to reconstruct parts
of human traditions and thus parts of moral behavior, but will never be able to construct an
entirely new moral system or dismiss all the traditions that have emerged through time.
In order to understand this individualistic perspective it is important to focus on Hayek’s
notion that the competition of rules leads to the social order. Both abstracts and concrete types
of rules of conduct form a framework of rules in which a selection process takes action.
11 Any
change in the environment necessitates a reaction by the individuals. Old rules of conduct will
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8 Hayek (1988:16).
9 See Hayek (1988, ch. 2 and 3)
10 Hayek (1988:52): “Indeed, the basic point of my argument – that morals, including, especially, our institutions
of property, freedom and justice, are not a creation of man’s reason but a distinct second endowment conferred
on him by cultural evolution – runs counter to the main intellectual outlook of the twentieth century.”
11 Hayek (1988:74) “Civilization is not only a product of evolution – it is a process; by establishing a framework
of general rules and individual freedom it allows itself to continue to evolve.”8
be tested through the selection process about their beneficial outcome for the society, which
means the growth of the group.
Two different types of selection now govern the behavior of individuals: Either regularities of
action arise from innate and genetic behavior, or they are learned and stem from learning
processes influenced by human civilization. Any change in the rules of conduct is of course
the outcome of an evolutionary process, but due to the subjectivist character of the cognitive
processes it is not a predictable one.
Hayek’s morality of small groups: a simple kin selection model
We argue that Hayek’s model does not follow a general model of group selection but
resembles a series of properties within kin selection models where the strategies are not
transmitted genetically but by learning. This idea is supported by Hayek’s thoughts on the
transmission of the rules of morality by learning. Modern learning theories, which emerged
after Hayek’s death deliver the current explanation of Hayek’s intention and solve many of
his problems he faced by redefining his own ideas against the realm of biological theories.
Kin selection models in general provide explanations to a broad series of problems in social
and cultural evolution. Their extension to cultural evolution may be helpful because of the
“human capacity for reckoning kin beyond the associative contiguity of mother and sibling”.
12
In order to back Hayek’s thoughts on small groups we may use a kin selection model. At this
starting point instincts and thus genetic transmission determine individual behavior. Myerson
et al. (1991) offer an explanation stemming from the strand of biological games. Contrary to
economic games that matches Hayek’s morality of small groups. Knudsen and Foss (1999)
define a kin group as a group of individuals who have the same genotype and therefore use
the same strategy and introduce a viscosity parameter d with 0 < d < 1 .
13
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Two types of interactions occur:
- An individual meets an individual in the subpopulation with probability 1-d .
- An individual meets his kin with probability d. Meeting a kin implies meeting an individual
playing the same strategy and having the same expected value of future payoffs- or simply:
doing exactly the same. Kins do exactly the same – no matter what they really do – following
a certain and well-defined and shared mental model. Their mental model may change over
time as well as their goals, but it is necessary for the argument that kins always do the same.
Interactions with kins means at least to have the same definite goals, while an interaction with
other members of the subgroup needs only to have the same concrete goals as a basis for
cooperation.
14
Formally, following Myerson et al. (1991),  s (d) denotes the fraction of the population
playing the strategy d. Of course,  s( ) d
d = ￿ 1. The standard case to play a strategy e in a
population delivers the following expected utility by summing up all utilities, times the
probability of their appearance within the population:
[ ] u e P d u e d
d ( , ) ( ) ( , ) = ￿ ￿ s
where u(e,d) denotes the utility playing e against d. By using this form we get
[ ]
[ ]
u e P u e e d u e d
d u e d u e e
d
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Here, s  is  a d -viscous population equilibrium (Myerson et al. (1991:103).
By using u e d u e d u e e '( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) = - + 1 d d  as a new game we can transform the following
simple PD-game with the following payoff
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C D
C 3 / 3 0 / 5
D 5 / 0 1 / 1
into a perturbated game with the following utilities:
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This perturbated game leads to the following pay-off matrix:
c d
c 3 / 3 3d / 5-4d
d 5-4d /3d 1 / 1
It is easy to see that a no Prisoners’ Dilemma properties arise as long as d exceeds ½. This
backs Hayek’s some thoughts on primitive societies: morality needs to create an environment
where people behave the same way. Defection is driven out by this assumption or:
cooperative behavior in small groups is ensured not by rationality, but by the behavioral
assumption that kins behave the same way. In part, this matches the earlier argument of
Hayek’s theory of mind: Cultural evolution coincides with traditions that generate a
sufficiently high state of equal-minded behavior and thus a sufficiently high d.
Basing on Hamilton (1964), Knudsen and Foss (1999) argue that under certain conditions of
inter-group selection cultural evolution can only be possible when cognitive friction between
the groups exists. Also, cooperation in societies does not depend on the absolute value of di. It
is only important that the average d meets a certain value. Depending on the setting, this
average d can be relatively small. This leads to a first interpretation of altruism in cultural
evolution: The transition from a small group to an open society may be accompanied by a less
necessity  to behave as kins: Individuals interacting with others in different subgroups do not11
need to meet their kins in all subgroups any longer with a probability of at least 50% in order
to rule out defection.
Extending the thoughts: Cultural learning and Hayek’s Sensory Order
Despite this interesting starting point, simple kin selection models show a not unimportant
drawback: kinship arguments are not suitable for explainig cooperation in human society at
large. First, as Eshel et al. (1999) argue, two randomly chosen individuals are not likely to be
related. Second, genetic transmission does not lead to uniformity in human kin groups. Third,
a change of rules is limited to what Hayek calls a change of the sensory order. As implied in
the model above, if selection occurs, all kins must change together since they share a strategy
they need to ensure cooperation in their small group. Kinship behavior ensures cooperation,
but to change behavior, all kins must change. Also Knudsen and Foss (1999) do not follow an
individual learning theory. In detail, they do not explain how structured interactions are
intertwined with individual learning processes and the selection of rules in a dynamic setting
since their theory focuses on firms. In other words, cognitive friction in general is a Hayekian
argument, however it does not deliver further insights on why individuals may decide the one
or the other way. Wherever the learning behavior of individuals does not change, this leads to
the relevant kin selection environment. While the Hamilton (1964) and Myerson et al. model
(1991) are able to explain kin selection and thus the morality of small groups, we also want to
show how by an individual choice of rules from a broader environment the large society may
evolve. Cultural learning has a different starting point compared with kinship behavior.
In Hayek’s definition, rules of conduct are instructions on how to act. Many of them are
transmitted genetically, however, most of them evolve during societal evolution In this case
they represent cultural heritage. Rules that are not fixed genetically need to be acquired by the
individual, in short, they must be learned. Every individual has his specific sensory order and
therefore he perceives in a specific way because of his specific social environment where he
interacts with members of his kin group which in any case has lead to his specific history of
perceptions. Simultaneously he shares a series of other perceptions stemming from his
interactions with the whole subgroup he is living in. This point refers to the intertwined
character of rules and the social order. Rules hence may be distinguished by their type of
transmission (genetically or by learning) and by its degree of complexity.12
Commands as an example of rules of lower complexity form a well-defined instruction of
conduct. We can find this kind of rule in well structured orders like in small groups, such as
organizations, families or primitive groups. Commands concern only specific individuals in
their specific situations. If the environment becomes more complex, the rules of conduct gain
complexity. These rules are abstract ones, they usually arise spontaneously and play an
important role in Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution since they push forward the evolution.
These abstract and spontaneously emerged rules, like language, the rules concerning property
and the rules embedded in traditions and morals do not necessarily need to be understood by
individuals. Usually individuals do not even know that they act in conformity with such rules.
In these kind of rules we may find implicit knowledge: the rule doesn’t have to be verbalized
and consciously known by all members.
An important element separating Hayek’s work from standard scholarly work is the
dispersion of knowledge. The key is that routines, used by members in a group, have been
internalized in the human mind so that individuals may use it without reflecting on it. This
leads to a first implication for the emergence of rules of conduct. The capacity to behave in a
specific way according to special rules is intertwined with Hayek’s concept of tradition.
Implicit knowledge is embedded in traditions and therefore not accessable to rational
explanations. In other words, related rules of conduct contain a high degree of tacit
knowledge and thus cannot be reconstructed or consciously designed.
Hayek’s thoughts on the Theory of Mind begin with his rejection of tangible events. Human
perception can only be reduced to some aspects of an event. Hayek explains the sensory order
as a system of classification of categories and hence a tool anybody uses for classifying and
ordering his perceptions.
“All that we can perceive is thus determined by the order of sensory
qualities which provides the „categories“ in terms of which sense
experience can alone take place.“15
The sensory order is based on pre-sensory experiences. These in turn are the product of the
effects occuring through physiological impulses.
16 The set of impulses forms the sensory
order.
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“The process of experience thus does not begin with sensations or
perceptions, but necessarily precedes them: it operates on physiological
events and arranges them into a structure or order which becomes the
basis of their “mental” significance; and the distinction between the
sensory qualities, in terms of which alone the conscious mind can learn
about anything in the external world, is the result of such pre-sensory
experience. We may express this also by stating that experience is not a
function of mind and consciousness, but that mind and consciousness are
rather products of experience.”17
In a first step pre-sensory experiences form the sensory order. In a second step, physical
events, perceived through the sensory order lead to an abstract and categorized perception.
The sensory order thus forms a cognitive framework for individual choice. Physical events in
the environment which meet the human organism start its function. These physical events are
classified through the sensory order. The perception of individuals will be filtered by an act of
classification. Hence, the sensory order is unable to capture all the relevant aspects of an
incoming event since it is formed through pre-sensory experiences. At the beginning of
human evolution, only certain aspects that are crucial for the survival of the individual can be
captured and classified and thus transmitted towards the creation of an abstract perception.
18
This “pattern recognition” enables what Hayek calls the ability of recognizing only certain
aspects of physical events. An individual cannot understand complex phenomena like markets
or other systems of social order with respect to all their aspects. Hayek’s point is that since
they are simply not known at all, individuals may only predict the pattern of an event, but not
the event itself.
This notion makes clear that in Hayek’s view perception follows the sensory order. The latter,
as a system of classification is only capable to order perceptions that follow a certain
regularity:
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18 Bouillon (1991:83) explains Hayeks’s sensory order using the following example: We take the sound of a
clattering door as a physical event. The noise may be either the product of a synthesizer or of  a real clattering
door. No matter if the sound is produced by a synthesizer or by a real door, the sensory order classifies the rumor
of the synthesizer as belonging to the same class of sounds. Classifying means the process through which14
“Another interesting consequence following from our theory is that a
stimulus whose occurence in conjunction with other stimuli showed no
regularities whatever could never be perceived by our senses (6.36) This
would seem to mean that we can know only such kinds of events as show
a certain degree of regularity in their occurence in relation with others, and
that we could not know anything about events which occured in a
completely irregular manner.“ 19
Classes of stimuli lead to classes of responses: the set of rules from which individuals select
their own rules stems from individual perception and hence from their history. As Rizzello
(1997:241) emphasizes, it is mainly the feedback in any agent-environment relationship that
gradually leads to the formation of classes of stimuli and classes of responses.
Individuals therefore form their own sensory order that consists of the mental schemes
acquired by their own perception and history. To which extent people choose their rules they
accept will be influenced by the set of rules they already have learned.
In our view, two results are important for the rule selection process:
First, individuals perceive only rules from outside that can be classified by their mental
schemes and hence their already perceived set of rules formed by their own history. At the
beginning, individual perception is only allowed to vary slightly, otherwise the individual
would be unable to recognize the rules as such:
“The point on which the theory of the determination of mental qualities ...
differs from the position taken by practically all current psychological
theories is thus the contention that the sensory (or other mental) qualities
are not in some manner originally attached to, or an original attribute of,
the individual physiological impulses, but that the whole of these qualities
is determined by the system of connexions by which the impulses can be
transmitted from neuron to neuron ... that this system of connections is
                                                                                                                                                                                    
different events (synthesizer or door) are put into the same category. Our senses will hear only the abstract
aspect: clattering.
19 Hayek (1952:176,§8.39).15
acquired in the course of the development of the species and the individual
by a kind of ‘experience’ or ‘learning’ .. .”20
Therefore, the group exerts an important influence on the phylogenetic development of the
individual by contributing to the formation of the individual sensory order. As pointed out
below, this meets the requirements of a conservative learning model as described in Eshel et
al. (1999).
Second, following Hayek, a change in the set of rules that may be selected can only occur via
a change of individual perception. This needs to change the environment. Eshel et al. (1999),
following D. S. Wilson, presents a model with different learning and interaction environments
and show many similarities to a Hayekian model of cultural evolution.
Cultural evolution: kin selection and learning
Eshel et al. (1999:450) characterize cultural evolution as different from the genetic one as
occur when “an individual adopts a new mode of conduct he learns a set of rules that
determine his random behavior”
21. Starting with the concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies
(ESS) they define an unbeatable strategy as one to which a dynamic process converges -
starting from a state in which all but a finite number of individuals plays this strategy. In this
way, the local interaction structure matters as the individual strategy interacts with the
strategies of the individual’s immediate 2k players.
Playing a symmetric finite game W , the player gets the payoff as the sum of the payoffs from
his interaction with all his neighbors. The important feature of the Eshel et al. (1999) model
that makes it particularly suitable for an interpretation of Hayek’s process of cultural
evolution is the possibility to distinguish between learning and interacting neighborhood: As
long as n equals k, we have the situation of the “morality of the small group”. In this case,
intra-group selection cannot lead to a large culture since the rules.
22
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parallels of the relative sensory orders in a group and hence forms the collective quality of the sensory order.
21 Eshel (1999:450).
22 See e.g. Sober and Wilson (1998).16
To allow for cultural evolution, we need a process where the learning neighborhood n is
larger than the interacting neighborhood k – in Hayek’s view due to the extended mental
abilities that lead to a learning “governed by tradition and reason” and reflects the his
thoughts on experience and learning of the sensory order sketched above.
In the extreme case, where n = 1, an individual imitates only one of his immediate neighbors
(Eshel et al., 1999:455). In this case, any k leads to conservative learning processes and
strategies yielding the pareto payoff in simple coordination games are also unbeatable
strategies. If, more realistic, neighborhoods are large and the learning neighborhood is much
larger than the interacting neighborhood, the conditions for unbeatability differ. For
sufficiently large n, k with n/k = q in the Eshel et al. model the two conditions for
unbeatability can be combined by defining r (q) as:





















Following Eshel et al (1999:456) r takes values between 0 and 1 and is small when the
interaction neighborhood k is bigger than the learning neighborhood n, whereas r gets close to
1 when n is larger than k. Eshel et al. (1999:460) show that the unbeatable strategy in a
Prisoners’ Dilemma game is the cooperative one: For a sufficient large r, strategy C is
unbeatable in {W, r} if and only if it is unbeatable in {Wr, 0}, where Wr denotes in a standard
Hawk-Dove situation:
   a (1+r) b + rc
   c + rb d (1+r)
Since a strategy C is unbeatable in {Wr, 0} if for every strategy y ( , ) = y y 1 2 with  y2 0 = one
can transform the following equation - since w
r(y,y) denotes the payoff of the strategy y
againts itself in Wr
a r a r y b rc y a r y c rb y
r ( ) ( ) ( ) (y,y) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 + + + + + > + + + + w17
 into
( )[( ) ( ) ( )( ). 1 2 1 1 2 + - - + - > - + r a b c y a d y r c b
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Since in the Prisoners’ Dilemma a-d is always positive and one can assume that 2a-b-c > 0,
the above inequation holds for any r sufficently close to 1. The outcome of the Eshel et al.
(1999) model hence is that to cooperate is an unbeatable startegy whenever r is sufficiently
high.
24  Compared to the outcome of the extended Myerson et al. (1991) model this shows
that cooperation the properties are much more Hayekian: The result does not occur due to the
interaction with kins, but stems from a learning assumption where individuals learn only
when at least one of his two immediate neighbors plays a different strategy to his. This
reluctance to learn fits cultural learning much more that a biological setting and describes
human behavior in a cultural evolution setting.
As Eshel et al. (1999:462) conclude, the conservative assumption may also be relaxed: If an
individual is permitted to learn with a small probability when his two immediate neighbors
still use the same strategy and one of his four immediate neighbors plays a different one, the
results do not change.
Extensions
Again we should focus on the implications of both individual and group selection. Hayek’s
definition of morality has been equalized in the biological sense that morality may lead to
unselfish behavior among seemingly self-interested individuals. Morality instead forms the
current system of rules that defines individual action. It can be chosen by individuals
following certain patterns of perception and learning: Moral rules are the strategies that form
individual action and that identify the members of a group. Following a learning process,
moral rules can be learned by members of a different group. If an individual has adopted a
sufficient degree of moral rules of another group, he becomes member of this group.
                                                          
23 Eshel et al. (1999:460).
24 See Eshel et al. (1999:462). In contrast, Eshel (1972) has shown in an earlier deme model that mobility may be
detrimental for altruism. See also Uyenoyama and Feldman (1980) for further discussions.18
As mentioned already above, Vanberg (1986) argues that Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution
suffers from his attempt to combine an individualistic approach with a behavioral one. Later,
Hodgson (1993) has extended parts of this critique
25. We find that only Vanberg is right when
criticizing Hayek’s theory with respect to the question of collective action. His critique is
rather fundamental in the sense that he focuses on the central quality of Hayek’s selection
process which he finds unapplicable to problems of collective choice. In his view, other than
the rules of morality, constitutional rules - once established - cannot be altered by a
spontaneous process which may enable groups to adopt more efficient constitutional rules
since any change of these rules needs a collective choice mechanism.
To solve this problem from a current standpoint, one has two choices. The first one is, as
Sabooglu and Langlois (1995) did, to argue Hayek simply was not interested in defining and
analyzing clearly the rules that create an order and thus offered a rather incomplete model
from a public choice standpoint.
The second one is to follow Hayek’s notion that not only spontaneous processes emerge in
societies. In many cases a deliberate change of existing rules may form the only useful
solution (Hayek, 1973). Our interpretation is that by choosing new rules of morality
individuals exert power on societies to change constitutional rules. The relevant question of
group selection is now if societies change their system of concrete rules or rather get selected
out in the process of rule selection.
Hayek clearly argued in many of his works that spontaneous processes may also lead to
pressures in societies not only to punish deviators but also to change existing constitutional
rules. These processes of change however may be slower than the adoption of different moral
rules by individuals.
                                                          
25 On the viability of Hodgson’s argument see Zywicki (2000:88) who boils down Vanberg’s critique to his
scepticism about the viability of group selection to punish free riders and shows evidence for the human ability
to detect and punish cheaters, our focus is on the implication of individual selection to collective action.19
Conclusion
Rules per se have the general quality also to signal individuals in other groups to become
member of the group by adopting the rules. Again, cultural evolution is an open-ended
process. Following Sober and Wilson (1998), it is not sure to which end our societies will
come. It might also occur that human evolution will tend toward an adaptation of other
concepts. In our view, it is the individual perception governing the process of cultural
evolution. Individual perception also includes stability against the threats of mobility. (Eshel
1972).
The outcome of the selection process cannot be taken for granted in the sense that a group will
grow richer than other groups that do not act according to these specific rules. It is also
possible that non-efficient rules may gain ground and suppress the more efficient ones. This is
also valid for the rules of morality. Hayek deliberately mentions that societies may practice a
“wrong“ morality and may therefore decline.
With respect to large groups, Hayek shows many similarities to the later ideas of Denzau and
North (1994) in predetermining individual behavior through ideologies. His argument
however differs since he stresses the individual side: Whether individuals decide against or in
favor of one specific rule, this behavior cannot be captured by a group-specific prerequisite, it
will remain always their individual decision. Hence, Hayek’s approach on human cognition is
not based on group-guided ideologies.
Instead, he highlights individual selection at the very end: At this stage, the deliberate setting
of social and constitutional rules – extisting in virtually all societies – have overcome the
Hobbesian state of nature - and the question, to which degree individuals follow this rules
depends on individual perception. We have argued that cultural learning and hence individual
rule selection forms the restriction in human cognition due to the moderating effect of
tradition on individual cognition. The Hayekian preposition to preselect moral rules ensures
that humans seldom recognize rules that are completely different from existing ones – in other
words this reflects the prerequisite for a conservative learning environment leading from a kin
selection model representing the “small group” where behavior stems from instincts – up to
the open society where the learning neighborhood is larger than the interacting group of an
individual.20
Hayek’s thoughts might again gain ground since game theorists increasingly focus on
cognitive elements together with the analysis of how norms are applied and maintained.
Norms do not stand alone in a social process. If “the maintenance of norms has a cognitive
component, it is also the social process.”
26 This point of view reveals some of Hayek’s way of
defining the problem: The environment of interactions itself determines the extent to which
norms will be accepted in a society. As Bicchieri (1997:38) states, it plays a crucial role for
the survival of a norm in a group how individuals accept a norm. Here again, norms may
create behavioral uniformity, but Hayek’s emphasis was on individual selection.
                                                          
26 Bicchieri (1997:38).21
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